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Abstract
Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program com-
menced before the Indochinese refugee flow began, and 
it has continued for almost 40 years since it subsided. 
Although conceived of as a complementary partnership, 
private sponsorship plays out more as a tug-of-war between 
the conflicting interests of government and sponsors over 
selection control and numbers. While guided by addition-
ality, sponsors have been confronted with administrative 
and regulatory changes that challenge them to do more 
with less, and the fear that overall Canadian resettlement 
will reduce if their efforts are not expanded. A federal elec-
tion and change of government in October 2015 may have 
reset government-sponsor relations but highlights the vul-
nerability and interpretative malleability of the program. 
With the pillars of the Indochinese and now Syrian resettle-
ment efforts bookending the analysis, the article provides a 
historical and contextual understanding of recent changes 
to private sponsorship and the tensions and conflicting 
interests in maintaining a voluntary program premised on 
the resettlement of additional refugees.
Résumé
Le Programme de parrainage privé de réfugiés du Canada 
avait débuté avant l’influx des réfugiés indochinois, et a 
continué d’exister pendant presque 40 ans depuis la fin 
de cet influx. Le parrainage privé, bien que conçu comme 
un partenariat complémentaire, se manifeste en réalité 
plutôt comme un tiraillement constant entre les intérêts 
contradictoires du gouvernement et ceux des répondants 
en ce qui concerne la sélection et le nombre de réfu-
giés. Malgré le fait que les répondants sont régis par le 
principe d’additionnalité, ils font face à des changements 
administratifs ainsi que règlementaires qui exigent qu’ils 
fassent davantage avec moins de ressources, et se trouvent 
confrontés à la crainte qu’il se produise une réduction 
générale dans le nombre de réinstallations au Canada 
s’ils ne redoublent pas l’ampleur de leurs efforts. L’élection 
fédérale et le changement du gouvernement en octobre 2015 
a sans doute relancé les relations entre le gouvernement 
et les répondants, mais cela souligne en même temps la 
vulnérabilité ainsi que l’ambiguïté d’interprétation qui 
caractérise le programme. Avec les piliers des initiatives 
de réinstallation des réfugiés indochinois dans le passé et 
ceux des réfugiés syriens dans le présent servant comme 
balises aux deux extrémités de l’analyse, l’article fournit 
une perspective historique et contextuelle des changements 
récents au parrainage privé, et des tensions ainsi qu’inté-
rêts contradictoires qui résident dans le maintien d’un pro-
gramme volontaire fondé sur le principe d’additionnalité 
pour la réinstallation de réfugiés supplémentaires.
In the meantime, we would ask that all members of the House 
reach out to private sponsors and sponsorship agreement hold-
ers across this country to make sure that we fill the 1,300 places 
available. 
—Chris Alexander 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 27 February 2014
Private sponsorship is unique to Canada. Created out of the will of individual Canadians to help refugees and those in need, it was made possible through the 
willingness of Canadian politicians and immigration offi-
cials. The formal program was conceived of almost 40 years 
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ago as a complement to the Canadian government program 
of refugee resettlement. Resettlement is itself situated as a 
voluntary complement to the government’s commitment 
in international and domestic law to the concept of refugee 
asylum and the principle of non-refoulement.1 Resettlement 
represents the recognition that not all refugees can access 
asylum and that certain geographic regions face greater 
refugee flows than others. For private sponsors, their efforts 
are framed in the concept of “additionality”—making reset-
tlement available to additional refugees beyond government 
commitments. 
This article traces private sponsorship from its origins in 
advance of the Indochinese crisis of the 1970s to Canada’s 
Syrian resettlement response in December 2015. Sponsors 
rely on the government to facilitate their sponsorships as 
much as the government relies on sponsors to contribute 
to Canada’s humanitarian commitments. Yet, as a volun-
tary program designed through policy and regulation but 
no legal obligation, there is an interpretative malleability 
to the government–sponsor relationship that can lead in 
different directions, depending on the predilections of the 
government in power. In recent years resettlement and 
sponsorship experienced more focused government atten-
tion than in the program’s entire history. Policy and regu-
latory changes culminated in a state of flux and arguable 
crisis. Sponsors faced requests to do more with less, and the 
threat that overall Canadian resettlement would reduce if 
their efforts were not expanded. The complementarity of the 
model risks collapse as it is weighed down  by conflicting 
interests and compromise. With the unfolding of the Syrian 
tragedy and a change in the Canadian government in 2015, 
the moment of crisis seemingly abated, but maintenance of 
private sponsorship’s complementary role remains the con-
tinual challenge. Additionality can too easily devolve into a 
relationship of over-reliance and dependence.
Beginnings
Canada was a country of resettlement long before it became 
a country of asylum. Through the International Refugee 
Organization, Canada took in over 100,000 resettlement 
refugees in the late 1940s.2 This was followed by the admis-
sion of approximately 37,000 refugees from Hungary in 
1956 and 1957, 11,000 from Czechoslovakia in 1968, and 
7,000 Asians expelled from Uganda in 1972.3 Admissions 
were based on ad hoc decisions and orders-in-council.4 
They were also clearly ideological, strategic, and entirely 
selective.5 However, alongside these mass movement reset-
tlements, individual Canadians were angling to facilitate 
admissions on a smaller scale.
Both the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) and 
the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services (JIAS) of Canada were 
founded following the First World War to assist in immi-
gration to Canada.6 During the Second World War other 
religious collaborations followed, such as the Canadian 
Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (1946), 
the Approved Church Program (1953), and the National 
Inter-Faith Immigration Committee (1968), to bring in and 
support additional refugees and displaced persons.7 These 
initiatives stood in contrast to Canadian government action 
on refugee protection. While supporting the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) financially since 
its inception,8 playing a lead role in the drafting of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Con-
vention),9 and serving on UNHCR’s Executive Committee, 
Canada did not ratify the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Pro-
tocol relating to the Status of Refugees until 4 June 1969.10 
The Canadian government was reluctant to give up absolute 
sovereign control of its borders that the 1951 Convention 
requires for refugee admissions. Nor did Canada consider 
itself a country of first asylum.11
Canada’s eventual decision to ratify the 1951 Convention 
presented an opportunity for broader reform of Canadian 
refugee law. In Canada, a ratified international treaty must 
be implemented through domestic law to be enforceable. 
The Canadian government therefore needed to revise its 
immigration legislation to reflect Canada’s acceptance of the 
1951 Convention obligations and announced plans to design 
a new Immigration Act in September 1973.12 The legisla-
tive review process presented an opportunity for religious 
groups to lobby for the formalization of the private spon-
sorship they essentially already facilitated. In 1973, Joseph 
Kage, national executive vice-president of JIAS, suggested 
that in looking to revise the Immigration Act, “considera-
tion be given to provisions which would enable individuals 
or responsible voluntary social agencies to offer sponsor-
ship or co-sponsorship in deserving cases of refugees or 
other immigrants, which would come under the category of 
‘humanitarian immigration.’”13 Even earlier, in 1967, Kage 
was pushing for sponsorship. Commenting on the govern-
ment’s 1966 white paper on immigration, Kage wrote, “We 
also suggest that consideration be given to provisions which 
would enable individuals or responsible voluntary social 
agencies to offer sponsorship or co-sponsorship to deserv-
ing cases of refugees.”14 For the first time in Canadian law, 
the 1976 Immigration Act contained provisions for the pri-
vate sponsorship of refugees (PSR) alongside government-
assisted refugees (GARs).15
Private sponsorship was structured to occur through a 
“Group of Five” or through organizations holding “master 
agreements” with the government that limited the govern-
ment’s direct involvement with sponsoring groups.16 The 
underlying structure of private sponsorship has remained 
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relatively consistent over the intervening years. There are 
close to 100 Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHs) across 
Canada.17 What has shifted over time is the nature of the 
sponsorship applications. The program, as conceived, was 
to formalize the already occurring sponsorships of known 
individuals to be supported by groups such as JIAS and the 
MCC.18 The legislation came into force as media attention 
and public outrage grew over the worsening Indochinese 
“boat people” crisis of the late 1970s. Government officials 
used the sponsorship provisions as a means of directing 
engaged Canadians to action.19 Interest exploded, and pri-
vate sponsorship shifted from the resettlement of fewer than 
100 known refugees by the spring of 197920 to the resettle-
ment of 34,000 privately sponsored Indochinese between 
1979 and 1980.21 Unlike the earlier wartime efforts that 
created the push for the program, the Indochinese sponsor-
ship was primarily a sponsorship of strangers. There was no 
real Indochinese base in Canada. As the crisis subsided, a 
thriving sponsorship community had clearly arisen across 
Canada, but the nature of this sponsorship would shift with 
the interests of the sponsors. 
In 1990 the government commenced a review of the 
sponsorship program.22 The resulting report pointed to 
concern that the program was turning into a supplemen-
tary tool for expanded family reunification. The sponsor-
ship structure permits sponsors to either “name” the indi-
viduals they wish to sponsor or accept a referral from a visa 
officer of an individual requiring sponsorship. The ability 
to specify an individual for sponsorship is understandably 
appealing and grew as the sponsoring community itself 
grew with incoming refugees. Tom Denton notes, “Among 
the refugee-sponsoring community, the demand for family-
linked sponsorships is seen as being effectively without limit, 
because for every refugee who arrives sponsors estimate that 
at least two more sponsorship requests are generated.”23 The 
access that sponsorship provides to broader family reuni-
fication heightened when the government cancelled the 
Assisted Relative class in 2002.24 The Assisted Relative class 
reached beyond the immediate family class (spouse or part-
ner, dependent child, parent, or grandparent)25 to include 
extended relatives (uncle or aunt, brother or sister, non-
dependent son or daughter, nephew or niece, grandson or 
granddaughter).26 By 2003 some estimates put nominations 
of extended family or close friends at between 95 and 99 per 
cent of private sponsorship referrals.27 Sponsorship looked 
drastically different from the Indochinese movement of 
strangers. Additionality was operating but failing to com-
plement government efforts as intended. Naming refugees 
to sponsor as opposed to government referrals requires the 
further step of government approval. There has been a high 
refusal rate of sponsor-referred names (averaging 49 per cent 
between 1998 and 2007).28 Refusals drain resources without 
achieving resettlement, further thwarting additionality.
Reclaiming Control and Constraining Sponsorship
The government made attempts to reclaim control of the 
sponsorship program while encouraging increased refugee 
sponsorship, often as a trade-off for government assistance. 
A series of pilot projects with slightly different parameters of 
blended responsibility sharing were negotiated between the 
government and sponsoring groups. Blending of private and 
public support commenced with Project FOCUS Afghani-
stan. The project resettled 1,800 Afghan Ismaili refugees 
between 1994 and 1998. The government provided the first 
three months of settlement support, with private sponsors 
using this time to fundraise for the remaining nine months 
of support—a 3/9 model.29 Sponsors selected the refugees, 
but the cases were counted as GARs. A Special 3/9 Sponsor-
ship Pilot Program for refugees from the former Yugoslavia 
was similarly designed but with the referrals coming from 
the government.30 With the Sierra Leonean community in 
2001, the government offered a 4/8 model where the com-
munity could name its own referrals. The Anglican Primate 
reached a similar agreement with the government in 2009 
that likewise followed this 4/8 financial sharing.31 A blended 
3/9 program for Iraqi refugees was announced in March 
2011. Another blended 3/9 project with Rainbow Refugee 
Committee was announced the following week for the spon-
sorship of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer/
questioning (LGBTQ) refugees.32 This program was extended 
for an additional two years in March 2015. 33 A further form 
of blended support, the Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) 
program, is included with GAR numbers, but private spon-
sors provide supplemental, non-financial support to vulner-
able refugees with special needs.34 
As the government’s agreements with community groups 
increased, so too did efforts to constrain sponsorship in 
other directions. The government placed administrative 
caps on sponsorship submissions by SAHs in 2011 and 2012, 
with the intended goal of better management. The caps 
were both global and specific, targeting specific missions 
(Nairobi, Pretoria, Islamabad, and Cairo), thereby limiting 
sponsor ability to respond to specific refugees.35 This was 
accompanied in December 2011 with regulatory changes 
to formalize application procedures and limit eligibility for 
Group of Five and Community Sponsorships to refugees 
recognized by UNHCR or a state.36 Other changes have less 
directly but still significantly challenged the continuance of 
private sponsorship. An entire resettlement class, the Source 
Country class—which recognized certain states where indi-
viduals met the refugee definition but were not outside of 
their home country—was repealed in 2011, highlighting 
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the vulnerability of all resettlement programs to shifting 
government interests.37 A reduction in the age of depend-
ents for all immigration classes from under 22 to under 19, 
announced in 2013, came into effect 1 August 2014, limiting 
the family members who attach to a sponsorship.38 Whom 
sponsors could sponsor was increasingly limited.
In addition, in the spring of 2012, the government 
reformed the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) 
through two orders-in-council.39 The origins of the pro-
gram begin in a 1952 order-in-council designed to address 
the emergency medical needs of those in refugee-like situ-
ations following the Second World War.40 While the pro-
gram evolved and shifted over the following 60 years, in 
2012 it provided health-care coverage to protected persons, 
government-resettled refugees, privately sponsored refugees, 
refugee claimants, and refused refugee claimants whose 
negative decisions were under judicial review or appeal 
or who were awaiting removal from Canada. Coverage 
extended until provincial or territorial coverage triggered 
or the individual left Canada. The 2012 reforms created a 
tiered system of coverage. Most significant for a discussion 
of resettlement is that before the 2012 reforms, the IFHP pro-
vided basic health coverage, as well as supplemental cover-
age for prescription drugs, dentistry, and vision care for all 
resettled refugees. The reforms reduced privately sponsored 
refugees to services only “if they are of an urgent or essen-
tial nature,” whereas government-assisted refugees retained 
extended coverage equivalent to that under provincial and 
territorial benefits.41 
Hospitality House Refugee Ministry, a leading sponsor-
ship group based in Winnipeg, Manitoba, challenged the 
reforms in Federal Court, alleging that the order-in-council 
breached the contract between the SAHs and Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada (CIC).42 Their underlying concern 
was that sponsors would now be responsible for the dif-
ferential health-care costs.43 The application failed. Justice 
O’Reilly found that the agreement did not specify the level 
of funding to be provided, there was no evidence the order 
was enacted without regard to sponsors’ interests, and even 
if there was a breach of contract, the breach would give rise 
to an action for damages but would not invalidate the order 
by way of application to the Federal Court. Sponsors were 
left vulnerable to the whim of government change.
While the Hospitality House application was specific 
to SAHs, another broader Federal Court challenge on the 
constitutionality of the reforms succeeded in July 2014. Jus-
tice Mactavish held the reforms constitute “cruel and unu-
sual treatment” in violation of section 12 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and violate section 15 of 
the Charter in the differential treatment between refugee 
claimants from Designated Countries of Origin and those 
from non-Designated Countries of Origin. The decision 
gave the federal government four months to remedy the 
cuts before a declaration of invalidity was triggered. The 
minister of citizenship and immigration, Chris Alexan-
der, immediately indicated that the decision would be 
appealed.44  On 5 November 2014, at the four-month dead-
line and having been denied a stay,45 the government reluc-
tantly instituted a new Federal Health Program, described 
as  “temporary  health-care measures .  .  . consistent with 
the Federal  Court’s ruling.”46 The new measures were not 
as extensive as the pre-2012 changes and remained tiered 
in the offering of coverage to different refugee categories. 
The applicants, arguing that the interim measures failed 
to meet the identified Charter violations, returned to Jus-
tice Mactavish requesting further orders for direction and 
clarification in relation to the 4 July 2014 order as well as 
an order compelling the government to comply with the 
judgment. Justice Mactavish held the requests to be beyond 
her jurisdiction, given the finality of her original ruling.47 
The interim measures denied privately sponsored refugees 
coverage for prescription drugs or supplemental health cov-
erage, both of which remained covered for GARs. 
Shifting Responsibility 
Seen in their totality, the changes directly to and affecting 
private sponsorship highlight a clear divide and increas-
ing animosity between refugee advocates and government 
refugee policy. Private sponsors in particular have been 
constrained by the recent regulatory and administrative 
changes. While the government continued to corner spon-
sors, it also shifted more responsibility and expectation onto 
the sponsorship community. In CIC’s 2009 annual report to 
Parliament, the minister highlighted a doubling of privately 
sponsored Iraqi refugees accepted over the following five 
years.48 In 2010, the government prefaced the legislative 
package to reform Canada’s refugee law with an announced 
increase to Canada’s resettlement program of up to 2,500 
spaces per year.49 The increase allotted 500 more spaces 
to government resettlement, with the remaining 2,000 
spaces open for private sponsorship. This made sponsors 
responsible for 80 per cent of the increase. With the 2012 
Budget, the government shifted 1,000 refugee spaces from 
the government-assisted program to private sponsors.50 In 
2013, the government announced an initial commitment 
to resettle 1,300 Syrian refugees by the end of 2014.51 This 
number included 200 GARs, with the remaining 1,100 refu-
gees expected to arrive through private sponsorship over 
and above the current spaces in the program.52 The private 
sponsorship commitment, made on behalf of sponsors by 
the Canadian government, was the fifth-largest confirmed 
pledge for the admission of Syrian refugees received by 
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UNHCR by June 2014, behind pledges by the United States, 
Germany, Austria, and Sweden.53 The Canadian govern-
ment promise meanwhile ranked tenth. 
Despite a seemingly continual stream of announced 
increases to refugee resettlement over the past few years, the 
actual arrival numbers show a decline. The 2010 announce-
ment of a 2,500 increase amounted to a promised expan-
sion of the resettlement program by 20 per cent. Ultimately 
there was a drop in resettlement numbers by 26 per cent 
between 2011 and 2012. In its 2013 annual report, the gov-
ernment explained the 2012 numbers: “Many of CIC’s visa 
offices were affected by instability and heightened security 
concerns in some parts of the Middle East and Africa.”54 
Even if this explanation is accepted, by 2011 42 per cent of 
resettled refugees were privately sponsored. In comparison, 
between 2001 and 2008 government resettlement numbers 
were approximately double private sponsorship numbers, 
whereas by 2013 the ranges were almost equivalent for each 
program. The 2013 annual report, did state, “CIC continues 
to maintain its commitments under the Balanced Refugee 
Reform Act to increase the annual number of refugees reset-
tled from abroad to as many as 14,500  refugees by 2013.” 
Total 2013 resettlement amounted just over 12,000, and no 
similar statement of commitment was made in the 2014 
annual report.55 
Government resettlement and private sponsorship from 
2001 to 2014 is charted in table 1, as well as the percentage 
yearly change in admission. Overall resettlement between 
the two groups differs by just over 100 admissions between 
2001 and 2014, but how the numbers fall between sponsors 
and the government differs significantly. Between 2001 and 
2013, the trend was a general decline in government num-
bers (from 8,679 in 2001 to 5,661 in 2013), while sponsorship 
numbers almost doubled (from 3,576 in 2001 to 6,269 in 
2013).
A similar graphing of GAR and PSR numbers until 2013 
in a Library of Parliament research publication on resettle-
ment surmises, “As most of the government’s increase to 
the resettlement target is allocated to private sponsorship 
(2,000 out of 2,500 spots), the trends evident in Figure 1 are 
likely to continue.”56 And yet, this was more than a “trend.” 
It was an intentional and significant reallocation of resettle-
ment numbers from government to private citizens. 
The 2014 numbers show a significant drop (27 per cent) in 
private sponsorship while government numbers realigned 
with earlier years, hovering between 7,000 and 8,000. The 
government can increase quotas and announce grand 
expansions, but it remains up to individual Canadians to 
voluntarily take on the personal and financial responsibility 
to sponsor. The Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) notes, 
“Canadians have a range of reasons for getting involved in 
sponsorship, but often a sense of personal connection with 
a particular region or individual is key (which is why named 
sponsorships are so important). It is not so clear how broad 
the motivation is to resettle refugees based on government 
priorities, particularly if there is a perception that sponsors 
Table 1. GARs/PSRs ranges and landings 2001–2014
Year
GAR PSR Total
Ranges Actual % change Ranges Actual % change Actual % change
2001 7,300 8,679   2,800–4,000 3,576   12,255  
2002 7,500 7,505 -14 2,900–4,200 3,041 -15 10,546 -14
2003 7,700 7,508 0 2,900–4,200 3,252 7 10,760 2
2004 7,400 7,411 -1 3,400–4,000 3,116 -4 10,527 -2
2005 7,300–7,500 7,424 0 3,000–4,000 2,976 -4 10,400 -1
2006 7,300–7,500 7,326 -1 3,000–4,000 3,337 12 10,663 3
2007 7,300–7,500 7,572 3 3,000–4,500 3,588 8 11,160 5
2008 7,300–7,500 7,295 -4 3,300–4,500 3,512 -2 10,807 -3
2009 7,300–7,500 7,425 2 3,300–4,500 5,036 43 12,461 15
2010 7,300–8,000 7,264 -2 3,300–6,000 4,833 -4 12,097 -3
2011 7,400–8,000 7,363 1 3,800–6,000 5,584 16 12,947 7
2012 7,500–8,000 5,412 -26 4,000–6,000 4,225 -24 9,637 -26
2013 6,800–7,100 5,661 5 4,500–6,500 6,269 48 11,930 24
2014 6,900–7,100 7,573 34 4,500–6,500 4,560 -27 12,133 2
Sources: CIC, Summative Evaluation of Sponsorship, 3.2.1 (2001–6 ranges); CIC, 2007–14 annual reports to Parliament on immigration (2007–14 ranges); CIC, 
Facts & Figures 2010 (2001–5); CIC, Facts & Figures 2014 (2005–14).
Note: Figures 1–3 are based on this table.
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Figure 1. GAR, PSR, and total
are being asked to fill in the gap created by government cut-
backs.”57  Additionality depends on the will of sponsors.
A little over a year after the announced doubling of 
Iraqi refugees, the government offered up the blended 3/9 
program for Iraqi refugees, seemingly to encourage the 
sponsorship it had previously promised and still need-
ing to “fill in the gap.” Following the multiple and various 
pilot projects, the government launched the Blended Visa 
Office-Referred Program (BVOR) in 2013.58 The program 
increases the amount of government support from earlier 
pilot projects but takes back the control over naming that 
many of the earlier blended models left with sponsors. The 
program matches private sponsors with refugees referred 
for resettlement by the United Nations under a cost-sharing 
model where the government splits financial support with 
sponsors, each covering six months. As well, the referred 
refugees are “travel-ready,” which means that rather than 
waiting years for processing, refugees arrive in Canada 
within one to four months.59 Resettled refugees in this 
category still receive full IFHP coverage.60 While constrain-
ing private sponsors’ ability to sponsor the refugees they 
choose, the BVOR program offers the carrot enticement of 
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less financial obligation, more support and faster arrivals. 
But it requires sponsors to bite and sacrifice the principle 
of naming with a program that further blurs additionality.
In the first year, the plan was to resettle 200 Iraqi, Iranian, 
Burmese, Eritrean, and Bhutanese refugees through BVOR.61 
BVOR targets in 2014, increased to 500, were placed not on 
refugees but on visa offices in Amman, Ankara, Beirut, 
Cairo, Nairobi, Singapore, and Bogota.62 Actual 2013 num-
bers totalled 153 and increased to only 177 in 2014. 63 By 2015, 
the government goal was to match between 700 and 1,000 
refugees with sponsors each year through the program.64 
The 1,000 BVOR allocation replaced an equivalent number 
of GARs moved out in the 2012 Budget.65 In a five-minute 
promotional video for the new program put out by CIC, the 
narrator begins: “The Government of Canada has intro-
duced a unique program to help refugees. The Blended Visa 
Office-Referred program makes it easier for private spon-
sors to provide support . . . to refugees in need.” The video 
ends with a refugee speaking directly to the camera: “I want 
to send message for them. Please, there’s many families that 
are looking for hope to . . . to help them.”66 Ostensibly, this 
message is speaking to private sponsors.
Sponsors are clearly aware of the protection needs of 
refugees. Engaging in hands-on and direct settlement 
assistance, they are the voice of support and advocacy in 
Canada. The program immerses Canadians in the personal 
experiences of refugees.67 Refugees constitute their friends, 
family, and community. The video’s plea, through its own 
rhetoric and projection of the refugee, is questionable. It 
implies that it is the responsibility of private Canadian 
citizens, rather than the Canadian government, to provide 
the humanitarian response to protection needs. James 
Hathaway pointedly notes, “The government should not be 
permitted to make the implementation of its international 
burden-sharing obligation largely dependent on the good-
will of the private sector.”68 Catherine Dauvergne suggests, 
“Private sponsorship both allows the government an easy 
response to domestic pressure to act more humanely and 
allows it to withdraw from direct responsibility for admis-
sion totals .  .  . the obligation is privatized and thus the 
responsibility of the nation is drastically reduced.”69 These 
concerns are not new, they are the continual challenge of 
the government–sponsorship relationship. 
When the government added sponsorship provisions 
into the regulations in the 1970s, church groups expressed 
concern that “the government intended to use the plan as a 
means of dumping its responsibilities for refugees onto the 
private sector.”70 In the midst of the Indochinese sponsor-
ship, when the government seemingly reneged on a prom-
ise to match private sponsorship on a one-to-one basis,71 
the Standing Conference of Canadian Organizations 
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Concerned for Refugees sent a letter in December 1979 to 
Prime Minister Joe Clark, Minister of External Affairs Flora 
MacDonald, Secretary of State David MacDonald, and 
Immigration Minister Ronald Atkey, stating, “We are not 
prepared to release the government from its obligations.”72 
The idea of private sponsorship, from the outset, was one 
of additionality. Additionality is the shield that protects 
against the over-reliance and dependence that Hathaway, 
Dauvergne, and others fear in the privatized offering. Even 
in 1979 when sponsor-government relations were straining, 
Employment and Immigration Canada put out a fact sheet 
for sponsorship that read, “Canadian groups and organiza-
tions who are prepared to act as sponsors, supplying the 
more personalized settlement services needed by displaced 
and persecuted people, will have a direct influence on the 
total number of refugees that can come to Canada. This is 
because refugees assisted in this way are admitted over and 
above those planned for in the government’s annual refugee 
resettlement plan.”73 Government documents continue to 
recognize this principle of additionality. The Guide to Pri-
vate Sponsorship states, “Canadian citizens and permanent 
residents are able to provide additional opportunities for 
refugees.”74 Yet, after almost 40 years of negotiating their 
role, sponsors still must reassert additionality.  
With low 2014 sponsorship numbers and less than half 
of the 500 target for BVORs met, fears that overall Cana-
dian resettlement would reduce if sponsor efforts were not 
expanded seemed well-founded. The goal of additionality 
risks backfiring into a reduction of resettlement numbers: 
“If private sponsors are unable to meet the targets set by 
government for blended sponsorships, it has been suggested 
that the places will go unfilled. Private sponsors are thus put 
in the unenviable position of needing to work hard to ensure 
that refugees don’t end up deprived of the opportunity for 
safety and a new life in Canada. Far from adding to the gov-
ernment’s numbers of refugees resettled, private sponsors 
seem to be responsible for ensuring that the government’s 
numbers are not reduced!”75 The concern with the privatiza-
tion of a responsibility that rests with the state is heightened 
by the recollection that private sponsorship is particular 
to Canada. Resettlement is regarded by UNHCR as not only 
a tool of protection but as a mechanism for international 
burden or responsibility sharing.76 Sponsorship serves not 
only as a response to domestic pressure but as a response to 
other states and international calls. As other governments 
offer support, is it ever right for the Canadian government 
to point to its private citizens to answer the call?
Syria
The current unrelenting flow of refugees from Syria echoes 
the Indochinese need for a response beyond direct asylum. 
It is also a strong and recent example of the tendency for 
the Canadian government to turn to sponsors in response 
to both domestic questions on Canada’s commitments and 
international calls for humanitarian assistance. In May 2013, 
an emergency debate on Syria was conducted in the House 
of Commons.77 Questions on resettlement were raised, but 
UNHCR had not yet recommended that states engage in this 
solution. In July 2013, the Canadian government announced 
its intention that 1,300 Syrian refugees would be resettled to 
Canada by the end of 2014.78 UNHCR had requested the reset-
tlement of urgent and vulnerable cases, and Canada com-
mitted to resettle 200 vulnerable refugees through the GAR 
program in 2013 and 2014. The remainder of the announced 
commitment, 1,100, was to occur through private sponsor-
ship. The CCR responded, “This is causing some surprise as 
it is not known that any private sponsors had individually or 
collectively signalled their capacity to take on this number of 
sponsorships (which represents a financial responsibility of 
between $8 million and $12 million).”79 The CCR raised con-
cerns at that time regarding the inability of private sponsors 
to resettle from Turkey where many Syrians had fled80 and 
the additional costs resulting from reduced IFHP coverage. 
Restrictions on Group of Five sponsorships to recognized 
refugees prevents these sponsorships during mass refugee 
flows such as Syrian refugees where UNHCR cannot con-
duct individual status determinations. SAHs further noted 
the challenge of such a large sponsorship with no advance 
warning or consultation prior to the media announcement.81 
Within a few months of the announcement, the CCR added, 
“Given the delays and barriers in the private sponsorship 
program, it is not expected that many privately sponsored 
Syrian refugees will arrive by end of 2014.”82 
By October 2013, UNHCR issued a call for countries to 
admit up to 30,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2014. In 
early 2014, the Canadian government faced questions in the 
House of Commons and from media on Canada’s resettle-
ment process for Syrians, compared to the commitments 
of other countries. Immigration Minister Chris Alexander 
responded by asking that “all members of the House reach 
out to private sponsors and sponsorship agreement holders 
across this country to make sure that we fill the 1,300 places 
available.”83 Later his press secretary reiterated, “Hundreds 
of private sponsorship opportunities remain. We encourage 
sponsorship agreement holders to do their part to help dis-
placed Syrians as well.”84 The government message made it 
clear that the finger was pointed at private sponsors. When 
UNHCR requested that countries resettle more Syrian refu-
gees, asking states to take 100,000 Syrian refugees in 2015 
and 2016, the Canadian Immigrant Settlement Sector Alli-
ance urged Canada to commit to 10,000 refugees by 2016.85 
In response, Minister Alexander talked about how much 
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more can been done if the GAR program is combined with 
“innovative forms of private sponsorship.”86 Sponsorship 
was clearly and unapologetically front and centre in the 
government’s approach to Syria.
At the same time SAHs, willing to sponsor despite the lack 
of notice and increased expenses, were sharing with media 
their frustrations with sponsorship processing and delays. 
SAHs indicated that privately sponsored Syrians would not 
arrive in Canada for two to three years87 and complained of 
the “difficulty and costs associated with the process.”88 In 
May 2014, the Syrian Canadian Council asserted that none 
of 1,300 refugees had made it to Canada and that “private 
sponsorship is almost impossible.”89 Processing times for 
private sponsorship applications in Syria’s neighbouring 
countries ranged from 24 months in Beirut to 43 months 
in Cairo as of July 2014.90 By the end of June 2014 it was 
reported that the government was expediting applications 
for Syrian refugees.91 
In January 2015, the government announced an addi-
tional 10,000 Syrian refugees would be resettled to Canada 
over the next three years.92 In the same announcement, the 
minister of immigration indicated that since July 2013 more 
than 1,285 Syrian refugees had been approved for resettle-
ment in Canada and more than 1,075 of those had already 
arrived by 5 January 2015. These numbers were below the 
1,300 promise, even with the government going above their 
own commitment of 200 and approving the resettlement of 
360 Syrians. Private sponsorship numbers were therefore 
quite high, and significantly above government numbers, 
but not maximized. Once again, with the announcement of 
the intended resettlement of 10,000 Syrians over the next 
three years, the majority of this promise, 60 per cent, was 
allocated to private sponsorship. Once again, this allocation 
was made without consulting sponsors.93 
The difficulty with this messaging is that it absolves the 
government of responsibility for either action or failure. If 
the numbers are met and the refugees arrive, it is the result 
of private efforts and not an engaged government response. 
If the numbers are not met and the refugees do not arrive, 
blame lands on private sponsors. It has been said that spon-
sorship is the “political barometer” of refugee support in 
Canada.94 The government itself has acknowledged that 
“the willingness of so many Canadians to give so generously 
of their time to assist refugees is a visible demonstration of 
their commitment to continuing Canada’s humanitarian 
tradition.”95 A failure to meet the promised numbers there-
fore leads not only to fewer refugees receiving protection 
but to a powerful suggestion that resettlement is neither 
demanded nor supported by Canadian citizens. 
And yet the numbers and financial contributions of 
Canadians tell a different story. Since 1979, private Canadian 
sponsors have resettled over 225,000 refugees. Canadian 
private citizens have resettled more refugees than most gov-
ernments, ranking fourth behind the United States, Canada 
and Australia.96 In 2006, CCR assessed the annual financial 
costs of private sponsorship at $79 million, with an addi-
tional volunteer contribution of over 1,600 hours per refu-
gee family.97 A “Sponsorship Cost Table” prepared by CIC in 
2014 estimates the cost of sponsoring a single individual at 
$12,600.98
The history of private sponsorship in Canada is a proud 
one.  In 1986, UNHCR awarded the people of Canada the 
Nansen Medal for their resettlement of the Indochinese.99 
While recipients have included private citizens, politicians, 
royalty, and organizations, the award to the Canadian 
people is the only instance where the entire population 
of a country was recognized. In 2012 Australia initiated a 
private sponsorship program, the Community Proposal 
Pilot,100 after several years of community advocacy, point-
ing to the Canadian program as a model.101 During the 2013 
emergency session in the House of Commons on the crisis 
in Syria, Paul Dewar reminded members of Parliament of 
the actions of private sponsors, including his mother, then 
mayor of Ottawa Marion Dewar, during the Indochinese 
conflict: “They said we must do more. They held local meet-
ings where people—church groups, bowling teams and oth-
ers—sponsored refugees, to help those people who were on 
the high seas and who were being left behind .  .  . It was a 
grassroots movement that said that as Canadians we have 
something to do . . . We went from having a quota of 8,000 
refugees for that year. Because of grass roots and because 
Canadians mobilized and said we could do something about 
this, it changed to 60,000.”102 There is a powerful, convinc-
ing, and inspiring pull to the power of private sponsorship 
and the legacy of the Indochinese resettlement. 
Minister of Immigration Chris Alexander wanted Cana-
da’s Syrian response to be “one of our large, national efforts 
in response to a serious crisis on par with our response to 
the Iraqi crisis, the Vietnamese boat people, Idi Amin in 
Uganda in 1972 and the 1956 crackdown in Hungary.”103 
Responses to the crises in Uganda and Hungary predate the 
sponsorship program and constitute part of the rationale 
to introduce the regulations. The Indochinese response 
cemented the program into the Canadian psyche. But the 
Indochinese resettlement also weaved through two fed-
eral elections in Canada and three changes of the political 
party in power. The minority Liberal government of Pierre 
Trudeau made the original pledge in 1979 to accept 5,000 
refugees. Following a change in government in May 1979, 
the minority Conservative government led by Joe Clark 
increased the number to 8,000 and made the later promise 
of 50,000 through a government-sponsor matching formula 
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by the end of 1980.104 While sponsorship soared, the gov-
ernment struggled and ultimately opted to maintain the 
50,000 resettlement figure by shifting government-assisted 
refugee spots to privately sponsored refugees. At the time 
of the government’s decision, on 5 December 1979, private 
sponsorship was at 26,196 refugees, already exceeding its 
25,000 portion, whereas the government had resettled only 
approximately 12,000 refugees. This left a further 11,800 
refugees to be resettled, now by private citizens.105 In April 
1980, the majority Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau 
re-assumed power. As the new immigration minister, Lloyd 
Axworthy announced the government’s renewed commit-
ment to the Indochinese and increased resettlement targets 
to 60,000 on 2 April 1980.106 The 60,000 target unofficially 
rebalanced the matching formula between sponsorship and 
government resettlement. The announcement and swift 
changes mark the line between politics and law and the role 
each plays. Shortly after, Gerald Dirks observed, “Any con-
tentiousness associated with refugee admission to Canada 
in recent years has not arisen due to inadequacies in the 
legislation but rather has resulted from policy preferences 
and day-to-day administrative procedures determined by 
the cabinet and officials of the Employment and Immigra-
tion Commission.”107 The law was broad and the policy 
malleable. 
Canada’s resettlement of Syrian refugees likewise experi-
enced a change of government in the midst of the initiative. 
Almost a decade of Conservative leadership ended with the 
election of the majority Liberal government led by Justin 
Trudeau on 19 October 2015. Resettlement was a key election 
issue in 2015, receiving far more prominence than during 
the elections that spanned the Indochinese crisis, or in the 
nine federal elections and other refugee crises in between.108 
During the campaign, Justin Trudeau pledged to bring in 
25,000 government-assisted Syrian refugees to Canada by 
the end of 2015, significantly exceeding competing party 
promises.109 By the end of November, the new government 
revised its election promise and committed to bringing in 
10,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2015, with the remain-
der arriving by February 2016.110 The initial Liberal election 
promise stood out on its recommitment to GARs, making 
government promises for government resettlement instead 
of promises for private sponsors. By November, with the 
realities of screening and processing refugees setting in, 
the revised plan relied heavily on private sponsors: “The 
government also has several thousand applications in pro-
cessing for privately sponsored refugees (PSRs) under way, 
and these will be included as part of the commitment.”111 
At the close of 2015, Minister McCallum announced that 
just over 6,000 Syrians, mostly privately sponsored Syr-
ians, had arrived in Canada.112 While sponsored refugees 
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will facilitate the February 2016 timeline, the government 
remains, at the time of writing, committed to 25,000 Syrian 
GARs in 2016: “The government’s commitment to bringing 
in Syrian refugees will continue in 2016. Given the current 
initiative includes privately sponsored refugees, this will 
include taking in more government-assisted refugees (GARs) 
to reach a total target of 25,000 GARs.”113  What this means 
for future Canadian resettlement numbers, both GAR and 
PSR, is difficult to predict. 
The previous government’s 2010 promise of a 20 per cent 
increase to resettlement was never met. In 2009 total reset-
tlement numbers sat at 12,461, while in 2015 the target range 
was 11,900–15,200.114 At the low end, this is no increase at 
all. At the high end it just passes the 20 per cent increase, 
but this number includes 1,000 BVOR, a massive leap from 
the currently released numbers. The BVOR targets may now 
be reached or surpassed as the crisis in Syria has sparked 
an unprecedented interest in resettlement and private 
sponsorship reminiscent of the uprising of sponsorship 
support during the Indochinese crisis of the 1970s.115 Syrian 
resettlement by both the government and private sponsors 
will significantly raise overall resettlement. It is question-
able, though, whether this level of interest and support will 
continue as sustainable sponsorship support or a singular 
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response to a particular moment. Nor, as figures 2 and 3 
illustrate, have numbers regularly come close to the upper 
threshold allowances in the last decade.
There have been reassurances that the Syrian effort will 
be over and above yearly resettlement targets and recogni-
tion that the immense tragedy of the Syrian people cannot 
overshadow the plight of other refugees in need of protec-
tion and resettlement. UNHCR now estimates there are 
1,150,300 refugees in need of resettlement. This is a 50 per 
cent increase in need from 2012, and projections continue 
to increase.116 Canada’s moment of generosity on the Syrian 
front is a mere drop in the bucket. How Canada will set new 
targets and balance private and government responsibilities 
remains to be seen. The Liberal government has indicated 
that it intends to reverse many of the constraints put on 
sponsors by the previous government. The mandate letter 
to the new minister of immigration, refugees and citizen-
ship, John McCallum, includes directions to return the 
maximum age for dependent children from 19 to 22, reduce 
visa application processing times, and fully restore the 
Interim Federal Health Program.117 Whether caps on spon-
sorship submissions, the limitations on Group of Five and 
Community Sponsorships, or the shifting focus of the BVOR 
program continue are unknown. 
Figure 3. Privately sponsored refugees ranges and landings, 2001–2014
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Sponsorship arose out of a desire to do more. The past 
decade witnessed a period in which the program operated 
arguably out of a fear that to do otherwise would amount to 
less being done. The first comprehensive review of the pri-
vate sponsorship program in the 1990s cautiously acknowl-
edged, “It remains to be seen whether the resource is renew-
able, like forests, or whether it more closely resembles gold 
and, once again mined, is depleted.”118 Past policies and 
numeric shifts suggest a government assumption that spon-
sorship capacity is unlimited. Sponsors, despite hesitations, 
complaints, and a frustration at the lack of consultation, 
continue submitting applications that reaffirm the myth of 
renewability, even in moments of crisis. If the Syrian cri-
sis brings in new sponsors and resets government-sponsor 
relations, it is a moment for both sides to assess their role in 
the program. This piece is not prescriptive, nor are sponsors 
a single-minded community, but historical understanding 
and contextual knowledge are necessary to address how to 
move forward, to reassert additionality, and to maintain 
incentives for sustainable sponsorship.
Acknowledgments
This paper benefitted from the exceptional research assis-
tance of Nora Fien and was supported by the University 
Research Grant Program at the University of Manitoba.
Notes
 1 For a discussion of the general challenge of operating a 
resettlement program alongside the obligation of asy-
lum, see Shauna Labman, “Queue the Rhetoric: Refugees, 
Resettlement and Reform,” University of New Brunswick 
Law Journal 62 (2011): 55–63.
 2 David Corbett, Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Critique 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 198–9.
 3 Sharryn J. Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters: National 
Security and Canadian Refugee Policy,” Revue québécoise 
de droit international 14, no. 2 (2001): 9.
 4 Gerald E. Dirks, “A Policy within a Policy: The Identifi-
cation and Admission of Refugees to Canada,” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 17, no. 2 (1984): 280; Alan G. 
Green and David Green, “The Goals of Canada’s Immi-
gration Policy: A Historical Perspective,” Canadian Jour-
nal of Urban Research 13, no. 1 (2004): 102. 
 5 See Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters,” 9; James C. Hatha-
way, “Selective Concern: An Overview of Refugee Law in 
Canada,” McGill Law Journal 33, no. 4 (1987–8): 677–8.
 6 Howard Adelman, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees 
(Regina: L. A. Weigl Educational Associates, 1982), 107. 
An Order in Council, 2 June 1922, permitted Mennonites 
from the Soviet Union to come to Canada but required 
that the Canadian Mennonite community take respon-
sibility for the care of the newcomers so that they would 
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
76
not become a burden on the state. William Janzen, “The 
1979 MCC Canada Master Agreement for the Sponsorship 
of Refugees in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Mennon-
ite Studies 24 (2006): 212.
 7 Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy 
and Public Concern (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1972), 304–5.
 8 In 1957 Canada became a member of the United Nations 
Refugee Fund Executive Committee. The Executive Com-
mittee of the High Commissioner’s Programme was 
established in 1958 by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) Resolution E/RES/672 (XXV) (30 April 1958), and 
Canada continued on as a member. UNHCR, “Excom Mem-
bership by Date of Admission of Members” (30 June 2009).
 9 Laura Madokoro, “‘Belated Signing’: Race-Thinking and 
Canada’s Approach to the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees” (forthcoming). 
 10 UNHCR, “States Parties to the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,” http://www.
unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf. Earlier, 
the 1966 White Paper on Immigration recommended that 
Canada accede to the 1951 Convention and introduce sep-
arate legislation to “help refugees.” Department of Man-
power and Immigration, White Paper on Immigration 
(Ottawa: 1966), 54–5. 
 11 Canada continued to see itself as operating a refugee pro-
gram directed primarily at resettlement, until the 1990 
Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels, 
which acknowledged that it “has become a country of first 
asylum for thousands of people.” Employment and Immi-
gration Canada, Annual Report to Parliament: Immigra-
tion Plan for 1991–1995 (Ottawa: EIC, 1990), 5.
 12 Office of the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, 
“Statement by the Honourable Robert Andras, Minister of 
Manpower and Immigration,” 17 Septemeber 1973. Prior 
to this announcement, a rudimentary system for deal-
ing with resettlement and refugee claims in Canada was 
implemented through Cabinet documents 27 July 1970 
and 16 September 1970 and Operations Memorandum 17 
January 1971, amended 19 June 1972. This scheme shaped 
Canada’s response to the Indochinese refugees from May 
1975 to December 1978. With thanks to Mike Molloy, for-
mer director of Refugee Policy Division, for this point.
 13 Joseph Kage, “Stepping Stones towards the New Canadian 
Immigration Act,” Jewish Immigrant Aid Society Infor-
mation Bulletin no. 347 (20 November 1973), 12.
 14 Joseph Kage, “Re-Appraising the Canadian Immigration 
Policy: An Analysis and Comments on the White Paper 
on Immigration” (January 1967), 18, Canadian Jewish 
Congress Charities Committee National Archives.
 15 Immigration Act, SC 1976–77, c 52.
 16 Barbara Treviranus and Micheal Casasola, “Canada’s Pri-
vate Sponsorship of Refugees Program: A Practitioner’s 
Perspective of Its Past and Future,” Journal of International 
Migration & Integration 4 (2003): 184; Janzen, “1979 MCC 
Canada Master Agreement,” 212.
 17 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (hereafter CIC), 
“Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program: Sponsorship 
Agreement Holders,” http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refu-
gees/sponsor/list-sponsors.asp.
 18 The MCC was the first national church body to sign a Mas-
ter Agreement. Janzen, “1979 MCC Canada Master Agree-
ment,” 211.
 19 Howard Adelman, “The Policy Maker and the Advocate: 
Case Studies in Refugee Policy,” in Making Knowledge 
Count: Advocacy and Social Science, ed. Peter Harries-
Jones (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1991), 62. 
 20 Employment and Immigration Canada, Indochinese Refu-
gees: The Canadian Response, 1979 and 1980 (Ottawa: Min-
ister of Supply and Services Canada, 1982), 18.
 21 Ibid., 8.
 22 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Private Sponsor-
ship of Refugee Program,” Refuge 12 (1992): 3. 
 23 Thomas R. Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee 
Sponsorship in Manitoba,” Journal of International Migra-
tion & Integration 4 (2003): 264.
 24 The cancellation of the Assisted Relative category occurred 
through the repeal of the Immigration Regulations, 1978, 
SOR/78-172, by the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s 364(a) that accompanied the 
introduction of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act. In a 2004 resolution the Canadian Council for Refu-
gees notes, “Cancellation of the Assisted Relative category 
has greatly increased the pressure on the Private Sponsor-
ship program.” Canadian Council for Refugees, “Assisted 
Relatives: Resolution number 2” (November 2004), www.
ccrweb.ca/en/res/assisted-relatives.
 25 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 
12(1); Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, s 
117(1).
 26 Immigration Regulations, s 2(1).
 27 Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee Sponsorship,” 
258.
 28 CIC, Summative Evaluation of the Private Sponsorship of 
Refugees Program (2007), 4.0.
 29 Ibid., 1.2.1. 
 30 CIC, A Broader Vision: Immigration Plan (1996 Annual 
Report to Parliament), (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada, 1995), 14.
 31 CIC, “Government of Canada and the Anglican Church of 
Canada Encourage Canadians to Sponsor Refugees,” news 
release, 16 April 2009; CIC, “Canada and Anglican Church 
Give 50 Refugee Families New Hope,” news release, 13 Feb-
ruary 2012.
 32 CIC, “Government of Canada to Help Gay and Lesbian 
Refugees Fleeing Persecution,” news release, 24 March 
2011.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
77
 33 “Rainbow Refugee Assistance Program Extended for 2 
Years,” CBC News, 10 March 2015.
 34 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, s 157; 
CIC, Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program 
(Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Ser-
vices Canada, 2011), 25.
 35 CIC, “Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refu-
gee Protection Regulations and Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis Statement,” SOR/2012-225, 146:23 Canada Gazette (9 
June 2012).
 36 CIC, “Notice Requesting Comments on a Proposed Regu-
latory Amendment That Will Affect the Private Sponsor-
ship of Refugees Program,” 145:50 Canada Gazette (10 
December 2011); Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations, s 153(1)(b).
 37 CIC, “Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refu-
gee Protection Regulations and Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis Statement,” 145:2 Canada Gazette (19 March 2011).
 38 CIC, “Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refu-
gee Protection Regulations and Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis Statement,” 147:20 Canada Gazette (18 May 2013); CIC, 
“Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection” 148:13 Canada Gazette (18 June 2014). 
 39 Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 2012, 
SI/2012-26 (5 April 2012), 146:9 Canada Gazette (25 April 
2012); Order Amending the Order Respecting the Interim 
Federal Health Program, 2012, SI/2012-49 (28 June 2012) 
146:15 Canada Gazette (18 July 2012), replaced the 1957 OIC, 
effective 30 June 2012.
 40 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 
65 para 35.
 41 The original Order (SI/2012-26) cut coverage for all 
resettlement refugees, but the amended Order (SI/2012-
49) provided that extended coverage was to be granted to 
government-assisted refugees, while only basic coverage 
was to be given to privately sponsored refugees.
 42 Hospitality House Refugee Ministry Inc v Canada (AG), 
2013 FC 543. In November 2015, Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Canada was rebranded as Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship Canada (IRCC).
 43 Ibid., para 7.
 44 Laura Payton, “Federal Government to Appeal Ruling 
Reversing ‘Cruel’ Cuts to Refugee Health,” CBC News, 4 
July 2014.
 45 A request to stay Mactavish’s order pending the appeal 
was denied by Justice Webb on 31 October 2014. Canada 
(AG) v Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care 2014 FCA 252.
 46 CIC, “Temporary Measures for the Interim Federal Health 
Program” (4 November 2014).
 47 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (AG) 2015 FC 
149. As discussed below, following the 2015 federal elec-
tion, the Liberal government announced intentions to 
fully restore the Interim Federal Health Program. See 
note 117.
 48 CIC, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, 2009 
(Ottawa: CIC, 2009). 
 49 CIC, “Expanding Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Pro-
grams,” news release, 29 March 2010. Bill C-11, Balanced 
Refugee Reform Act, was introduced the following day: 
Hansard: House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, 
No 20 (30 March 2010), 1005 (Hon. Jason Kenney, Minister 
of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism).
 50 Government of Canada, 2012 Federal Budget (29 March 
2012) shows the planned reduction in Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada spending in table 5.1 resulting from 
this shift.
 51 CIC, “Canada to Resettle 1300 Syrian Refugees by End of 
2014,” news release, 3 July 2013.
 52 Ibid.
 53 UNHCR, “Finding Solutions for Syrian Refugees: Resettle-
ment and Other Forms of Admission of Syrian Refugees” 
(11 August 2014).
 54 CIC, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2013 
(Ottawa: CIC, 2013), 17.
 55 CIC, Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration 2014 
(Ottawa: CIC, 2014). The 12,000 total includes the GAR and 
PSR numbers set out below (11,930) as well as 153 Visa Office 
Referred refugees set out in the 2014 annual report and 
discussed below.
 56 Sandra Elgersma, “Resettling Refugees: Canada’s Humani-
tarian Commitments,” pub. no. 2015-11-E (Ottawa: Library 
of Parliament Research Publications, 2015).
 57 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Important Changes 
in Canada’s Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program” 
(January 2013).
 58 CIC, “Blended Visa Office-Referred Program: Sponsoring 
Refugees” (30 April 2014).
 59 Mennonite Central Committee, “Blended VOR Initiative: 
2014 Update” (2014); CIC, Guide to the Private Sponsorship, 
11.
 60 CIC, Information Sheet for Interim Federal Health Program 
Beneficiaries (14 February 2014), 2.
 61 CIC, “Blended Visa Office-Referred Program.”
 62 CIC, “Government of Canada’s Immigration Planning 
Story: Operational Targets by Office (Non-Economic)” (16 
April 2014).
 63 CIC, Annual Report 2014: Facts & Figures 2014.
 64 CIC, “Blended Visa Office-Referred Program.”
 65 CIC, “Operational Bulletin 512 (Modified)—February 12, 
2014” (12 February 2014). CIC, “Supplementary Informa-
tion 2015”; CIC, “Departmental Performance Report (for 
the Period Ending March 31, 2012)” (30 May 2013). 
 66 CIC, “How to Sponsor a Refugee: Blended Visa Office-
Referred Program,” video (28 April 2014), http://www.cic.
gc.ca/english/department/media/multimedia/video/vor/
vor.asp.
 67 Treviranus and Casasola, “Canada’s Private Sponsorship 
of Refugees Program,” 178; UNHCR, Resettlement Hand-
book (November 2004), 220.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
78
 68 Hathaway, “Selective Concern,” 700.
 69 Catherine Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity, and 
Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and Canada (Van-
couver: UBC Press, 2005), 93.
 70 Adelman, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, 85.
 71 Adelman, “The Policy Maker,” 62; Howard Adelman, 
“Changes in Policy: Background on the Federal Govern-
ment Decision to Alter Its Position with Respect to the 
Indochinese Refugees,” in The Indochinese Refugee Move-
ment: The Canadian Experience, ed. Howard Adelman 
(Toronto: Operation Lifeline, 1979), 23.
 72 Ibid.; Adelman, “Changes in Policy,” 25. Formed in 1978, 
the Standing Conference of Organizations Concerned for 
Refugees was the original name of the Canadian Council 
for Refugees.
 73 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Sponsoring Refu-
gees: Facts for Canadian Groups and Organizations” (July 
1979), 2, http://cihs-shic.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
Sponsoring-Refugees-Facts-for-Canadian-Groups-and-
Organizations.pdf.
 74 CIC, Guide to the Private Sponsorship, 11. See also CIC, 
Report on Plans and Priorities 2014–2015, 2.2.2.
 75 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Important Changes.”
 76 “Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Strengthening and Expanding Resettlement Today: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities,” 4th Mtg., EC/GC/02/7 (25 April 
2002), para 5.
 77 House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 248 (7 
May 2013), 1840.
 78 CIC, “Canada to Resettle 1,300 Syrian Refugees.”
 79 Canadian Council for Refugees, “CCR Responds to Gov-
ernment Announcement on Resettlement of Syrian Refu-
gees” (8 July 2013).
 80 Sponsorship from Turkey is now possible. CIC initiated 
a pilot project in 2014, extended through 2015, for spon-
sorship from Turkey. Refugee Sponsorship Training 
Program, “Guidelines on Sponsorship of Refugees out 
of Turkey,” http://www.rstp.ca/en/refugee-sponsorship/
latest-policy-program-update/guidelines-turkey/.
 81 Ashley Chapman, “Time for Canada to Step Up on Syrian 
Refugee Crisis, Now,” Hill Times, 16 June 2014; Michael 
Swan, “Syrian Refugee Flow to Canada at a Trickle,” Cath-
olic Register, 26 June 2014. 
 82 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Canadian Immigration 
Responses to the Syrian Crisis: Backgrounder” (October 
2013).
 83 House of Commons Debates, (27 February 2014), 1500.
 84 Alexis Pavlich, quoted in Debra Black, “Slow Progress 
Raises Doubts about Government’s Syrian Refugee 
Pledge,” Toronto Star, 18 March 2014.
 85 Susana Mas, “Syrian Refugees: Canada Urged to Take In 
10,000 by 2016,” CBC News, 19 June 2014; Canadian Immi-
grant Settlement Sector Alliance, “CISSA-ACSEI Appeal to 
Minister Alexander” (4 June 2014).
 86 Mas, “Syrian Refugees.”
 87 Xueting Zhao, “Syrian Refugees Waiting for Canada to 
Open the Door,” Toronto Observer, 27 February 2014.
 88 Michelle Zilio, “Canada Has Only Settled ‘a Few’ Govern-
ment-Sponsored Syrian Refugees: Alexander,” iPolitics, 5 
March 2014.
 89 Lina Dib, “UN Asks Ottawa to Open Its Doors for Refu-
gees of Syria’s Brutal Civil War,” Canadian Press, 29 May 
2014. In June 2014, both the director of the Syrian Can-
adian Council of Montreal and the sponsorship direc-
tor of the Anglican United Refugee Alliance indicated 
that they had not heard of any of the 1,100 private spon-
sorship allotment actually arriving in Canada: “Syria’s 
Refugees: Is Canada Keeping Its Promise? A Timeline 
of As It Happens Coverage,” CBC, 26 June 2014 (June 12 
audio), http://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/thursday-
supreme-court-of-canada-f irst-nations-ruling-cbc-
strategy-seasick-shark-fisherman-and-more-1.2903421/
syria-s-refugees-is-canada-keeping-its-promise-a-time-
line-of-as-it-happens-coverage-1.2903424/.
 90 CIC, “Processing Times for Privately Sponsored Refugee 
Applications” (22 July 2014).
 91 Laura Lynch, “Syrian Refugee Applications Quietly Sped 
Up by Ottawa,” CBC News, 27 June 2014.
 92 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “Help-
ing to Protect the World’s Most Vulnerable,” news release, 
7 January 2015.
 93 Loly Rico, president, Canadian Council for Refugees, to 
Chris Alexander, minister of citizenship and immigration, 
“Letter concerning Resettlement of Syrian Refugees,” 14 
January 2015.
 94 Gertrude Neuwirth and J. R. Rogge, “Canada and the 
Indochinese Refugees,” in Indochinese Refugees: Asylum 
and Resettlement, ed. Supang Chantavanich and E. Bruce 
Reynolds (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chul-
alongkorn University, 1988), 254.
 95 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Private Sponsor-
ship,” 3.
 96 Treviranus and Casasola, “Canada’s Private Sponsorship 
of Refugees Program,” 180.
 97 Canadian Council for Refugees, “The Private Sponsorship 
of Refugees Program: Current Challenges and Opportun-
ities” (April 2006), 2.
 98 Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, “Fact Sheet: 
Sponsorship Cost Table,” March 2014, http://www.rstp.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Fact_Sheet_7_3_Sponsor-
ship_Cost_Table_Sept2014.pdf.
 99 UNHCR, “Nansen Refugee Award,” http://www.unhcr.org/
nansen/503625396.html. 
 100 Australia, Commonwealth, Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship, “Australia’s Humanitarian Program 2013–
14 and Beyond,” information paper (December 2012), 5.
 101 Refugee Council of Australia, “Australia’s Refugee and 
Humanitarian Program 2010–11: Community Views on 
Current Challenges and Future Directions” (February 
2010), 3.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
79
 102 House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 248 (7 
May 2013) 2000.
 103 Steven Chase, “Canada to Boost Efforts to Help Syrian 
Refugees,” Globe and Mail, 4 July 2014. 
 104 Ninette Kelley and Michael J. Trebilcock, The Making of 
the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 407.
 105 “Onus Put on Public Groups, Ottawa Won’t Sponsor More 
Refugees,” Globe and Mail, 6 December 1979; Adelman, 
“Changes in Policy,” 23.
 106 “Ottawa Revamps Refugee Program, Increases 1980 Quota 
by 10,000,” Globe and Mail, 3 April 1980.
 107 Dirks, “Policy within a Policy,” 299.
 108 See, for example, Laura Payton, “Election Issues 2015: A 
Maclean’s Primer on Syrian Refugees,” Maclean’s, 3 Sep-
tember 2015; “Stephen Harper Suggests Canada Will Do 
More to Help Syrian Refugees,” CBC News, 10 Septem-
ber 2015; Andy Blatchford, “Canada Election 2015: Syrian 
Refugee Crisis Re-emerges on Campaign Trail,” Huffing-
ton Post Canada, 8 September 2015; “Election Primer: The 
Refugee Crisis, Four Things to Know before You Vote,” 
Globe and Mail, 16 October 2015.
 109 Liberal Party, “Syrian Refugees,” https://www.liberal.ca/
realchange/syrian-refugees. The party platform did not 
attach a deadline to the commitment but the timeline was 
clearly put forward during the campaign. The New Demo-
cratic Party promised to bring 10,000 Syrian refugees to 
Canada by year end, and the Conservative Party promised 
to resettle 10,000 Syrians by 2017.
 110 Government of Canada, “Canada Offers Leadership on the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis,” news release, 24 November 2015.
 111 Ibid.
 112 Joe Friesen, “Liberals Fall Short of Year-End Goal for 
Refugee Resettlement,” Globe and Mail, 31 December 2015.
 113 Government of Canada, “Canada Offers Leadership on 
the Syrian Refugee Crisis.”
 114 CIC, “Supplementary Information to the 2015 Immigration 
Levels Plan.”
 115 Ratna Omidvar, “Private Sponsors Build a Nation—and 
Leave a Legacy,” Globe and Mail, 16 November 2015; Caro-
line Barghout, “Image of Alan Kurdi Dead on a Beach 
Moves Winnipeg Woman to Help Syrian Refugees,” CBC 
News, 25 November 2015.
 116 UNHCR, UNHCR Refugee Resettlement Trends 2015 (June 
2015), 7.
 117 Prime Minister of Canada, “Minister of Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Mandate Letter,” http://pm.gc.
ca/eng/minister-immigration-refugees-and-citizenship-
mandate-letter. On 16 December 2015 the Government of 
Canada announced that it would not pursue its appeal on 
the Interim Federal Health Program case and formally 
confirmed that all Syrian refugees, government and pri-
vately sponsored, were eligible for supplementary health 
coverage. Statement from the minister of immigration, 
refugees and citizenship, and the minister of justice and 
attorney general of Canada, Ottawa (16 December 2015); 
Government of Canada, “Interim Federal Health Pro-
gram Coverage for Syrian Refugees,” backgrounder, 16 
December 2015.
 118 Employment and Immigration Canada, Annual Report 
to Parliament: Immigration Plan for 1991–1995 Year Two 
(Ottawa: EIC, 1991), 22.
Shauna Labman is an assistant professor in the Faculty of 
Law at the University of Manitoba. She may be contacted at 
shauna.labman@umanitoba.ca.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 2
80
